Post by Austria on Jul 11, 2013 20:51:57 GMT -5
I promised Eliza to type out the stuff I found from my uni library, and after like three weeks, I finally did it... orz
Here is one chapter. I will type of the other chapter today. Tomorrow, another book.
Here you go-
THE HABSBURG MONARCHY 1809-1918
BY A. J. P. TAYLOR
THE END OF OLD AUSTRIA, 1865-1866
Schmerling had failed to break the resistance of the Magyars and had lost control of the Germans. Francis Joseph, though now starting on a different path, was still far from the idea of surrendering his power to either the Magyars or the Germans. The latest pronouncement of Deak seemed to offer some hope of a bargain which would leave the greatness of the Empire unimpaired; and in the west the alternative to sham constitutionalism, in the Emperor's eyes, was not real constitutionalism, but no constitution at all. Both Magyar and Germans were disqualified from office: a bargain had still to be struck with the Magyars, and the Germans, were tarred with liberal "disloyalty." The only alternative was the conservative nobility, the men of the October Diploma, and the new ministry was a "Ministry of Counts." This was not a simple return to the situation in 1860: then the Hungarian magnates had been in the ascendant, and federalism had not counted for much with Goluchowski, the Minister of State now the Hungarian Old Conservatives had disappeared, and federalism had to be practised more seriously in order to counter the demands of the German liberals. Belcredi, the new Minister of State, was a Moravian noble, not a Pole, and for him the pseudo-historical plan of the conservative party were a reality. Belcredi was a man of courage and of long administrative experience; like all the best Austrian nobles he cared deeply for the greatness of the Empire, but he genuinely believed that this greatness could be nest served by restoring to be nobles a position which they had never in fact possessed. Francis Joseph thought only of Hungary and supposed that the appointment of Belcredi would make agreement with Hungary easier; Belcredi imagined that he had been appointed to carry though a federal transformation of the Empire and so render concession to Hungary harmless. This misunderstanding caused ultimate disappointment for both Emperor and minister.
It was easy for Belcredi to reverse the policy of Schmerling. Schmerling's worse offence in Hungarian eyes had been the admission of the Saxons from Transylvania to the Reichsrat. This was now undone. The Transylvanian Diet, favourable to Vienna, was dissolved, and a new one, packed in favour of the Magyars, elected; its sole task was to vote the incorporation of Transylvania into Hungary. The Czech boycott of the Reichsrat was approved, and Francis Joseph announced his intention of being crowned King of Bohemia as well as King of Hungary. The Reichsrat was closed, More, the entire February Patent was "suspended," on the ground that it could not operate in one part of the Empire while the Emperor was negotiating about its amendment with another part of the Empire. The conservative nobility welcomed the disappearance of the February Patent and the defeat of the German bureaucrats which this implied; and Francis Joseph was delighted by the ending of its "constitutional" threat. Yet Hungary was the real gainer. The Austrian lands lost all public voice and could not be played off against Hungary; instead of Hungary bargaining with "Austria," she bargained directly with the Emperor. The Habsburgs and the Magyars became equal; and this guaranteed victory to Hungary in advance.
Once the Schmerling system had been destroyed, Belcredi's political resources were exhausted. He had nothing better to offer than Schmerling's policy of waiting;: Schmerling waited for the Hungarians to accept the February Patent, Belcredi waited for them to accept the October Diploma. The Hungarians would accept neither: they demanded throughout the restoration of the constitution of 1848, with only such modifications as they themselves should voluntarily propose. This demand was renewed when the Hungarian Diet met once more early in 1866. The Belcredi ministry offered Hungary only the restoration of county autonomy and a Diet with some administrative powers; Deak demanded a responsible ministry as provided by the laws of 1848. Deak sought to make this demand acceptable to the Emperor by outlining the arrangements with the rest of the Empire which this responsible ministry would carry in the Hungarian parliament. A committee of the Diet, under Deak's guidance, defined the common affairs of the Monarchy in which Hungary would share and proposed that these should be settled by Delegations from the Hungarian and Austrian parliaments. These Delegations marked a considerable advanced on the deputations which Deak had originally proposed: they were to be independent bodies, not bound by instructions and not responsible to the two parliaments which nominated them, and in case of disagreement they were to sit as a single body and reach a decision by a majority vote.
This arrangement, keystone of the Dualism created in 1867, seemed to give up the independence of Hungary on which Deak had always insisted; for foreign policy, and the military needs springing from it, would be imposed on the Hungarian parliament by a majority of the Delegations, and there would not be ministers of foreign affairs and of war responsible to the Hungarian parliament. It was the decisive breach with Kossuth's Hungary of 1848 and the decisive concession to the Imperial demand for greatness. Yet it was not as a concession, but as an increase of Hungarian power, that it was justified. The Hungarian Delegation, held together by Magyar solidarity, would always vote as a unit; the Austrian Delegation would split into German and Slavs, so that Hungary would impose her will and policy upon the entire Empire. The argument would never have occurred to Deak, whose vision was limited to the internal affairs of Hungary and to the assertion of the rule of law. That Deak accepted the argument and made it his own was the first sign of the influence of Julius Andrassy, now to be decisive in the making of Dualism. Andrassy, as a young dashing magnate, had been a close adherent of Kossuth in 1848, had been hanged in effigy by the executioners of Francis Joseph, and had accompanied Kossuth into exile. He had returned and made his peace with the dynasty, when he realised the futility of Kossuth's schemes to overthrow the Habsburgs with foreign revolutionary aid. Now he became Deak's principal adviser, and Deak had already decided that he should be the first Prime Minister of free Hungary.
The two men made good partners. Deak understood Hungarian law and the art of parliamentary tactics; Andrassy knew the great world and the art of diplomacy. Each represented in different form the Hungarian adaptation to the modern world which preserved Great Hungary until the twentieth century. Deak was the ideal type of the petty noble who had emerged from his comitat to become a parliamentary statesman and who had developed his devotion to the traditional institutions of Hungary into Magyar nationalism; Andrassy was the ideal type of magnate who had left the Imperial court for the Budapest parliament and who had also become, in his way, a Magyar nationalist. But much of this nationalism was play-acting: the magnates still aspired to play nationalism was play-acting: the magnates still aspired to play a great role in Europe, and Andrassy's deepest ambition was to be Foreign Minister of a powerful Austrian Empire, not to be Prime Minister of Hungary. Both men were moderate, Deak from wise judgement, Andrassy from harsh experience. Both men desired to compromise with the Emperor and to conciliate the nationalities - enough at any rate to keep them from acting as allies of Vienna. Andrassy, however, was in a hurry: he wanted to display his diplomatic talents to Europe and gave a cynical twist to Deak's love of tactical manoeuvre. Andrassy was the perfect intermediary between Deak and the Emperor. Francis Joseph was estranged by Deak's probity and by his legal pedantry; Andrassy conciliated him by his impatience to be done with internal affairs and his desire to see the Empire, in some new form, play once more a great part in Europe. Deak and Andrassy would both have been shocked by the later violence of Magyar nationalism; yet both based their moderation on tactics and so prepared the war for its overthrow. The Hungarian was yet to be born who would accept the Slavs and Romanians as equals.
In the spring of 1866 the Belcredi ministry was far from accepting the plans of Deak, even with the bait which Andrassy had tied to them. Like Schmerling, they had come to regard the Hungarian Diet as a subversive body. As son often in human affairs, men, brought to office to pursue one policy, found themselves in a short time pursuing its opposite. The Belcredi ministry had been appointed to strengthen the Empire for a war against Prussia by settling with Hungary; as the war with Prussia came nearer, they put off a settlement in the hope that a victory in war would make concession unnecessary. Mensdorff and Esterhazy had nothing which could be called a foreign policy - nothing except as assertion of all Austrian's claims and a refusal to seek allies by the slightest concession. They would not appeal to German national feeling against Prussia; at the same time they would not restore the conservative partnership by recognising Prussia as an equal. They would not make concessions to the "revolutionary" Napoleon III; they would not conciliate the Tsar by concessions in the Near East. They would not buy Italian neutrality by surrendering Venetia, and dreamt, even now, of restoring the settlement of Italy as it had existed before 1859. Old Austria committed a brainless suicide; and Bismarck went to war in order to impose on Austria a decision which her rulers were incapable of making for themselves. The Austrian ministers feared victory as much as defeat; for victory would compel Austria to become without reserve the leading German power and so cause the eclipse of the cosmopolitan Austrian nobility. Esterhazy, who contributed to the war more than any other expressed their outlook: "I hate this war; for, whether we win or whether we lose, it will no longer be the old Austria." As in 1859 and again in 1914, Francis Joseph and his advisers were set on war and equally set on defeat.
At the last minute, after Italy had made a military alliance with Prussia, the Austrian government decided to surrender Venetia, despite their previous protests of principles. The offer was refused by Italy. The Austrian ministers were now as obstinate in concession as they had been earlier in refusal. Since Italy would not accept Venetia, it should go to Napoleon III. On June 12, 1866, they bought the neutrality which Napoleon III had neither intention nor ability to abandon by promising to surrender Venetia, whatever the outcome of the war, and by agreeing to a French protectorate of the Rhineland. Thus, even before defeat, the Paramount Power of Germany and Italy abandoned both. Aristocratic incompetence and dynastic pride made defeat certain. Archduke Albrecht, the best general of the Monarchy, could not, as a member of the Imperial house, be exposed to the risk of defeat. He was therefore removed from Bohemia, the decisive theatre of war, to Venetia, which was being defended solely for the privilege of surrendering it; and a second-rate soldier, Benedek, was sent to Bohemia. Albrecht won an empty victory over the Italians at Custoza. Benedek blundered over Bohemia until attacked on two sides and his army routed by the Prussians at Sadova on July 3, 1866. Austria had still great powers of resistance. Archduke Albrecht, recalled from Italy, organised a new defensive front on the Danube and challenged Prussia to a long war. This was not necessary. Bismarck aimed to preserve Austria, not to destroy her; and pushed on peace negotiations the harder in order to avoid the mediation of Napoleon III or Russian demands for a reward in the Near East. By the Peace of Prague (August 23, 1866), Austria lost Venetia and was excluded from Germany; she remained a Great Power.
The Austria which emerged from the war of 1866 was created by Bismarck as much as the Austria which emerged from the Napoleonic Wars was created by Metternich: created, that is, not in its internal balance, but in its significance as a Great Power. Metternich's Austria was a European necessity; Bismarck's Austria was a German necessity, or rather a Prussian necessity. It was the essential barrier against Greater Germany, against the Pan-German programme which would swamp the Prussian Junkers. And since many others were opposed to Great Germany, Austria was welcome for them also. It was better than Greater Germany for the Czechs, the Poles, and the Slovenes; in the international field, it was better than Greater Germany for France. Moreover, the alternative to Greater Germany, if the Austrian Empire fell, or perhaps its accompaniment, would be Pan-Slavism and the extension of Russian power; therefore the Austrian Empire was welcome for England and even for conservative Russians who disliked Pan-Slavism. Dominant in Germany and Italy, Austria had challenged too grossly the nationalist dogma of the time; excluded from Germany and Italy, Austria served to postpone the raising of the great questions in central and eastern Europe from which the Powers still shrank. Italy resented the existence of Austria; but Italy was without power, except when associated with the grievances of others, and within a few years Austria, with Bismarck's assistance, supervised Italy's policy almost as closely as in the days of Metternich. The Russian expansionists whose eyes were fixed on Constantinople resented the existence of Austria; but they were in a minority and the decision went against them in Russian counsels, except for a few weeks in 1878, until the destruction of Bismarck's Europe in 1914. Everyone else wanted Austria to be kept going. After the war of 1866 the Habsburg Monarchy was undoubtedly a Sick Man; this very fact won her European tolerance and even support.
Metternich had recognised the danger of becoming solely a European necessity; and had sought, with little success, a "mission" which should make the Empire acceptable to its peoples and so less dependent on the favour of others. the search for a mission was renewed after 1866, with little more success than in the days of Metternich. The Magyars, indeed, found a mission for Austria in the furthering of Magyar hegemony in Hungary; and this suited Bismarck's need. Bismarck revived the German alliance with the Magyars, which had been part of the Frankfurt programme in 1848. Only he improved on it: Frankfurt had sought Magyar aid for Greater Germany, Bismarck used Hungary as an ally against it, and this policy was the more welcome to the Hungarians. Still, it could not be Austria's sole mission to serve the ambition of the Magyars, who were hardly a fifth of her population. The German still hoped that the Habsburg Empire would further German cultural and economy supremacy in south-eastern Europe, or at any rate within the Empire. This did no fit so easily into Bismarck's system. Bismarck could not allow the revival of German Austrian strength and therewith a renewed danger of the "Empire of seventy millions"; on the other hand, he couldn't allow the Austrian Empire to lose its German character and so become eligible as the ally of France or even of Russia. In fact, Bismarck wished to preserved Austria as she was in 1866 - defeated, but still German; and the suspended animation of Austrian politics in the age of Dualism was largely the result of German needs. Certainly Germany would have resisted any real Austrian attempt to follow the only mission which could have justified her existence: the discovery of a way of cooperation between people of different nationalities, not based upon the hegemony of a privileged nation or class. Not that Bismarck, still less any other German statesman, understood the nature of the Austrian problem. The Poles were the only Slav minority of whom Prussian politicians had experience, and these they ruled by force without serious effort to conciliate them. Force alone would not do in Austria; this had been the decisive form the experience both of Bach and Schmerling. Francis Joseph was reluctant enough to accept the aid of the Magyars; he would certainly not place himself in the hands of the Germans also - especially as these would acquire real force only with a Greater German programme, detestable alike to Francis Joseph and to Bismarck. Still without a free cooperation of the peoples, Greater Germany was certain. The only alternative was Russian hegemony in central and eastern Europe; and in the outcome the subjects of the Habsburgs experienced first one and then the other. This was the measure of Habsburg failure.
THE MAKING OF DUALISM 1866-67
In August, 1866, immediately after defeat, the Magyars offered themselves as partners. Deak declared that they asked no more after defeat than before it; he meant by this that their highest ambition had now become capable of practical achievement. Andrassy, coming to Vienna to confer with the Emperor, spoke already as an Imperial statesman. He had very different views on Austria from the Old Conservatives who had hitherto provided the link between the Emperor and Hungary. Andrassy desired an Austria centralised, liberal, and German, just as Hungary would be centralised, liberal, and Magyar. This was a revival oft the idea of 1848, except that the partnership was now between Budapest and Vienna, instead of between Budapest and Frankfurt, so that there would still be room for the dynasty. The Germans and Magyars were to be the two "Peoples of state"' as for the others, Andrassy said, "the Slavs are not fit to govern, they must be ruled." Dualism as a partnership between Magyars and Germans was a favourite idea, or more correctly a favourite misunderstanding, int the following years; it was far from being the intention of Francis Joseph. He had brought himself to make concessions ot the Magyars in order to avoid making concessions to any other groups; and he certainly did not intend to surrender his power to the German liberals. Andrassy's clever talk in favour of the German Austrians offended Francis Joseph and actually restored the position of Belcredi, which had been shaken by the lost war; for Belcredi combined support, somewhat grudging, of Dualism with resistance to liberalism. In July, 1866, Francis Joseph, still needing support against Prussia, seemed ready to accept all Hungary's demands; in August, with the signing of the Peace of Prague, the immediate crisis was ended, and Andrassy returned to Budapest empty-handed.
The Hungarian demands had been clearly stated Belcredi now planned that the other provinces of the Empire should be brought artificially to formulate similar demands, so that Hungary should lose her unique position. The provincial Diets had therefore to be recalled and induced to claim privileges which they had not exercised for centuries of often never possessed. If, however, the Diets were elected on the existing franchise, they would not claim these privileges; for "electoral geometry" would produce German majorities in favour of a strong central parliament. The electoral system had to be made anew, and unreliable, that is centralist, officials hastily replaced by federalist nobles. Belcredi, operating conservative policy more thoroughly than ever before, ran the more sharply against its great contradiction: he was proposing to challenge both the bureaucracy and the German middle class throughout the Empire by breaking the bonds of the unitary state as it had existed for more than a century, yet his conservatism debarred him from seeking allies other than the great nobility. Belcredi meant to manufacture Slav majorities in the Diets, but he did not wish these majorities to represent popular movements. He objected to the German majorities of Schmerling as liberal, not as German; and he turned to the Slavs as conservative, clerical, and respectful to the nobility. The Slavs were conservative and clerical from immaturity; and as they grew into political consciousness, they, too, became liberal and demanded the Rights of Man. Thus the only political allies of Belcredi were not a serious force; and as they webcam a serious force, the landed nobility would suddenly developed administrative skills and that the German bureaucrats would be loyal enough to assist in dissolving the unitary state which they had themselves created.
Belcredi had, however, only a few months in which to demonstrate the failure of Old Conservatism for the last time. He had seemed the only alternative ot the German liberals; and in October, 1866, Francis Joseph discovered a German and in a way a liberal, who was no associated with the German liberals of the Empire. Beust, who now became Foreign Minister, had been for many years Prime Minister of Saxony and a leading opponent of Bismarck in the German Confederation. His appointment announced a policy of revenge against Prussia: Beust had no reason for political existence except his hostility to Bismarck, and his very appearance in office was a provocative reassertion of the connection between Austrian and Germany. Beust was no Metternich equipped, or handicapped, with a political philosophy; his stock-in-trade, like that of all the statesmen in the unreal petty German states, was smartness - the clever phrase and the quick result with no thought of the consequences. Beust had no "views" about the Austrian Empire. Naturally he regarded it as a German state, since he had been dealing with it as such for years; but he had no emotional attachment to any particular policy - the tradition of the unitary Empire which dominated the bureaucracy, the pseudo-historic ambitions of the nobility, the dynastic "mission" to protect the subject peoples, were alike indifferent to him. His only concern was somehow to settle the internal affairs of Austria, so that it would once more inspire confidence abroad and he could proceed to build up an anti-Prussian coalition. He therefore looked straight at the central fact which bureaucrats and nobles, Schmerling and Belcredi, ahd alike evaded: the only important thing was to settle with Hungary, and the only way of doing it was to give Hungarians what they demanded. His grasp of this truth brought him success where his predecessors had all failed and made him, on the Imperial side, the creator of Dualism. Yet this very success in international affairs doomed his foreign policy. He gave the Magyars, and to a lesser extent the Germans, a voice in the affairs of the Empire; and these were the two peoples who would never support a war of revenge against Prussia. The Magyars knew that they owed their success to the defeat of Austria in 1866; the Germans, despite their resentment against Prussia, would not go against the German national state. thus by a supreme paradox, the political system devised by an exponent of war against Prussia ensured the permanence of Bismarck's work.
It never occurred to Belcredi that a "foreigner" would settle the Austrian problem behind his back. He went slowly on his way, provoking the provincial ambitions of the non-Hungarian lands. Even Belcredi, with his dislike of a central Reichsrat, realised that the individual diets were not imposing enough to impress Hungary; on the other hand he would not revive the February Patent which had been "suspended" in September, 1865. He therefore fell back on the clause of the October Diploma, which provided for occasional meetings of the non-Hungarian lands in an "extraordinary Reichsrat." He could thus escape the electoral provisions of the February Patent. The Diets would be instructed to elect their delegates by a simple majority instead of each curia voting separately; and the result would be a Slav-conservative majority in the Reichsrat instead of the German liberal majority produced by "electoral geometry." Negotiations with Hungary could thus be dragged out indefinitely. Meanwhile, Croatia could be encouraged to make demands against Hungary and thus to weaken Hungary from within.
While Belcredi methodically prepared his version of "electoral geometry," Beust acted. He visited Budapest and established close agreement with Andrassy: both men thought in terms of foreign policy and both regarded with impatience the dogmatism of Belcredi, the hesitations of Francis Joseph, and even the probity of Deak. Beust, once satisfied of the possibility of an agreement, persuaded Francis Joseph to abandon the traditional method of "bargaining" between King and Diet; the Hungarian leaders were regarded as a responsible government, according to the laws of 1848, and came to Vienna for direct negotiation. This was the decisive step, for in agreeing to a responsible government Francis Joseph had acceded to the Hungarian programme and had to accept concessions from the Hungarian ministers instead of they from him. They negotiations at Vienna were of a strange, illegal character: Andrassy and his colleagues already spoke for Hungary, and the Austrian ministers, though technically still Imperial ministers, spoke merely for the non-Hungarian lands, for the lesser Austria as created by Dualism. Francis Joseph, once convinced that the Hungarian proposals would leave him in control of the army and of foreign affairs, was in a hurry to finish; as always, impatience followed his prolonged hesitation, and he jettisoned old obligations and advisers. In December, 1866, a Croat deputation came to Vienna offering to cooperate with the Empire on an equal footing with Hungary; they were brusquely told that the services of Jellacic were not regarded with favour as they had been in 1848 and that they must settle with Hungary as best they cold. Belcredi was still able to issue a Patent on January 2 1867, for the meeting of an "extraordinary Reichsrat"; this was a vain expedient. He and the other Austrian ministers could only listen to the Hungarian proposals and sadly acquiesce, knowing that the Emperor had already made his decision. On February 7, 1867, Belcredi and "the Counts" were dismissed; and Beust was left alone, with a few officials, to wind up Old Austria. In this characteristic way, Dualism was manufactured helter-skelter; and the constitution of Austria-Hungary determined by a Saxon politician and a Magyar aristocrat.
The intention of all Austrian ministers, of Schmerling as well as of Belcredi, and the original intention of Deak, had been a settlement between the two "Imperial halves." Hungary had certainly been consulted; and Dualism did not become effective until transformed into a law of Hungarian parliament in march, 1867. The other, nameless "half" had no voice: Francis Joseph had settled without it. To wait for the consent of a non-existent Reichsrat seemed unnecessary; besides, the Reichsrat might dispute points which Hungary had already accepted. The Hungarians, however, insisted that the non-Hungarian lands must approve the settlement, though they could neither alter nor reject it. Beust therefore revived the February Patent, which had been designed for the entire Empire, and applied it which had been designed for the entire Empire and applied it casually to the "half"; the "narrower Reichsrat" of the Patent became henceforth the "ordinary Reichsrat" of constitutional Austria. This device ran up against the last relics of Belcredi. The Diets, elected under his management in November and December, 1866, were federalist or conservative; and five of the most important refused to acknowledge the February Patent or to send members to the Reichsrat. These recalcitrant Diets were abruptly dissolved, and the "electoral geometry" of Schmerling revived with such force that a German majority was manufactured even in Bohemia. Czechs and Slovenes continued to boycott the Reichsrat without avail. It had the appearance of a respectable parliament; and completed the formalities of Dualism by accepting the settlement as a "constitutional law" in December, 1867.
Dualism was exclusively a "compromise" between the Emperor and the Hungarians. The Hungarians agreed that there should be a single great state for war and foreign affairs; Francis Joseph handed over the internal affairs of Hungary to the "Magyar nation." The Hungarians also agreed that there should be a customs union with the rest of Monarchy, to be renewed every ten years. There were thus three separate organisations: the permanent "common monarchy," which still presented a great Habsburg Power to the outer world; the temporary economic union of Austria-Hungary; and the two separate states, Austria and Hungary. The "common monarchy" was confined to the Emperor and his court, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the inister of War. There was no common Prime Minister and no common cabinet. Beust, given the title of Imperial Chancellor in honour of his achievement in disrupting the Empire, attempted to exercise an authority superior to the two state ministries, and was imitated by a later Foreign Minister, Kalnoky; these attempts were successfully resisted by the Hungarians. Unofficially and without constitutional authority, the Crown Council of the Emperor acted as a common cabinet: it was attended by the two Prime Ministers, the common ministers, a few Archdukes, and the Chief of Staff. They could do no more than advise the Emperor; and decision on "great policy" remained in his hands. This had been the motive of Francis Joseph in making the compromise: in foreign affair he was still supreme.
etc....
The Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy (1867-1918)
Laszlo Csorba
Emperors and Kings - Antecedents of the Dual Monarchy
Having drawn certain conclusions from the events of 1848-1849, from the mid-1850s Hungarian and non-Hungarian contemporaries were preoccupied with the fundamental question of what form the relationship between Hungary and the Hapsburg Empire should take. The starting point, which was agreed to y every important player, was that in 1848 Hungary had managed to rid itself of the shackles of feudalism but that in the self-defensive war waged for national self-determination in 1849 the country had been defeated. As Ferenc Deak and his followers saw it, the Monarchy was an indispensable protective power for the Hungarians wedged in between the Slav and German peoples. The task, therefore, was to reach an agreement with the court in order to maintain the status of Vienna as a great power. Deak thought in terms of an agreement that would not contravene the provision of Hungarian self-determination, which was based on a personal union (similar to the one established in 1848). Indeed, it was hoped that as a part of the Hapsburg Monarchy, Hungary would be able to pursue its own "imperial" policies to a certain degree, primarily in regard to the Balkans. Lajos Kossuth and his followers, both in Hungary and abroad, shared the basic proposition made by Deak but came to a radically different conclusion. They were also of the opinion that a protective power was needed against German and pan-Slav pressure, but they did not believe that Austria was right for this role. They regarded it as too weak, chiefly because it prevented the nations living without its borders from realising their aspirations for national progress. The solution was some kind of alliance of the smaller nations along the Danube. This alliance could then be developed into a confederation built on democratic principles.
Both concepts took the same European and Hungarian realities as their starting point. For example, it was clear that there would be no modern capitalist economy, nor any rapid material or intellectual growth, without foreign capital. The two divergent solutions outlining Hungary's future development actually provided an answer to the question of what should be the source of the capital inflow essential for Hungary due to an insufficient domestic capital accumulation. Those who believed in the future of the Hapsburg Empire earnestly believed that Hungary's fate should be tied to the fate of the Empire and did not regard a certain limitation imposed on national self-determination as an unbearable sacrifice. On the other hand, those that had no faith in the Empire's future sought ways to be liberated from such bondage and were convinced that Hungary could only retain control over its own future if national self-determination was extended and developed into country's full Independence.
These two concepts offered true alternative not only because of the different standpoints and values they embodied - one of liberalism and the other of democratism - but also because in the 1850s it was not possible to "objectively" establish who would be right in regard to the fate of the empire. At the time, the Hapsburg Empire projected an image which could be interpreted as one of stability and of instability alike.
Ferdinand I's nephew, Franz Joseph, who succeeded him in 1848, lost Lombardy in 1859, in the war between the Italians, the French and the Austrians. In the early 1860s it was becoming increasingly evident that the Hungarian political leadership were not seeking a way out of the crisis - resulting from the autocratic nature of the imperial regime as well as by Hungary's passive resistance - through an agreement with the minorities and the development of social reform, which meant that the majority wished to pursue the political direction proposed by Deak and not by Kossuth. In the third Hungarian representative parliament that assembled in December 1865 Deak's party won a clear majority. In March 1866 a 67-member committee convened to prepare the proposal of "the common affairs", which delegated th task of dealing with the key issues to a 15-member sub-committee presided over by Count Gyula Andrassy, who had returned home from exile and was increasingly placed in the limelight by Deak.
On 3 July 1866, Franz Joseph finally accepted the proposal for a compromise from the Hungarian political leadership after the Austrian defeat at the Battle of Koniggratz. during the Austro-Prussian war, which had broken out to gain dominance over the German States, the Prussians even allied themselves with the fledgling Italian kingdom against Vienna. The Prussian division, which were better equipped and better led than their Austrian opponents, invaded Bohemia and won a decisive victory over the emperor's forces. The Austrian military failure marked the end of an historical process of six centuries: the Hapsburg State was squeezed out of Germany once and for all. Franz Joseph was forced to accept the humiliation that Prussia had excluded him and his empire from German unification. Franz Joseph and his Miltiades clique, who were thirsting for revenge against the Germans, realised that entering into a compromise with the Hungarians was an inevitable condition before further steps could be taken. The proposal had to be approved by parliament which reconvened for November 1866. The pivotal points of the agreement guaranteed the ruler's unrestricted command over the army and his right to pre-approve all proposals, ie. in parliament his ministers were only allowed to submit bills which the emperor had approved in advance. Gyula Andrassy's appointment as prime minister dates to 17 February 1867 and three days after this the third government responsible to parliament in Hungarian history was formed; on 20 March the common affairs ill was passed by 257 to 117, in the absence of 22 representatives and the Croatian delegates.
Here is one chapter. I will type of the other chapter today. Tomorrow, another book.
Here you go-
THE HABSBURG MONARCHY 1809-1918
BY A. J. P. TAYLOR
THE END OF OLD AUSTRIA, 1865-1866
Schmerling had failed to break the resistance of the Magyars and had lost control of the Germans. Francis Joseph, though now starting on a different path, was still far from the idea of surrendering his power to either the Magyars or the Germans. The latest pronouncement of Deak seemed to offer some hope of a bargain which would leave the greatness of the Empire unimpaired; and in the west the alternative to sham constitutionalism, in the Emperor's eyes, was not real constitutionalism, but no constitution at all. Both Magyar and Germans were disqualified from office: a bargain had still to be struck with the Magyars, and the Germans, were tarred with liberal "disloyalty." The only alternative was the conservative nobility, the men of the October Diploma, and the new ministry was a "Ministry of Counts." This was not a simple return to the situation in 1860: then the Hungarian magnates had been in the ascendant, and federalism had not counted for much with Goluchowski, the Minister of State now the Hungarian Old Conservatives had disappeared, and federalism had to be practised more seriously in order to counter the demands of the German liberals. Belcredi, the new Minister of State, was a Moravian noble, not a Pole, and for him the pseudo-historical plan of the conservative party were a reality. Belcredi was a man of courage and of long administrative experience; like all the best Austrian nobles he cared deeply for the greatness of the Empire, but he genuinely believed that this greatness could be nest served by restoring to be nobles a position which they had never in fact possessed. Francis Joseph thought only of Hungary and supposed that the appointment of Belcredi would make agreement with Hungary easier; Belcredi imagined that he had been appointed to carry though a federal transformation of the Empire and so render concession to Hungary harmless. This misunderstanding caused ultimate disappointment for both Emperor and minister.
It was easy for Belcredi to reverse the policy of Schmerling. Schmerling's worse offence in Hungarian eyes had been the admission of the Saxons from Transylvania to the Reichsrat. This was now undone. The Transylvanian Diet, favourable to Vienna, was dissolved, and a new one, packed in favour of the Magyars, elected; its sole task was to vote the incorporation of Transylvania into Hungary. The Czech boycott of the Reichsrat was approved, and Francis Joseph announced his intention of being crowned King of Bohemia as well as King of Hungary. The Reichsrat was closed, More, the entire February Patent was "suspended," on the ground that it could not operate in one part of the Empire while the Emperor was negotiating about its amendment with another part of the Empire. The conservative nobility welcomed the disappearance of the February Patent and the defeat of the German bureaucrats which this implied; and Francis Joseph was delighted by the ending of its "constitutional" threat. Yet Hungary was the real gainer. The Austrian lands lost all public voice and could not be played off against Hungary; instead of Hungary bargaining with "Austria," she bargained directly with the Emperor. The Habsburgs and the Magyars became equal; and this guaranteed victory to Hungary in advance.
Once the Schmerling system had been destroyed, Belcredi's political resources were exhausted. He had nothing better to offer than Schmerling's policy of waiting;: Schmerling waited for the Hungarians to accept the February Patent, Belcredi waited for them to accept the October Diploma. The Hungarians would accept neither: they demanded throughout the restoration of the constitution of 1848, with only such modifications as they themselves should voluntarily propose. This demand was renewed when the Hungarian Diet met once more early in 1866. The Belcredi ministry offered Hungary only the restoration of county autonomy and a Diet with some administrative powers; Deak demanded a responsible ministry as provided by the laws of 1848. Deak sought to make this demand acceptable to the Emperor by outlining the arrangements with the rest of the Empire which this responsible ministry would carry in the Hungarian parliament. A committee of the Diet, under Deak's guidance, defined the common affairs of the Monarchy in which Hungary would share and proposed that these should be settled by Delegations from the Hungarian and Austrian parliaments. These Delegations marked a considerable advanced on the deputations which Deak had originally proposed: they were to be independent bodies, not bound by instructions and not responsible to the two parliaments which nominated them, and in case of disagreement they were to sit as a single body and reach a decision by a majority vote.
This arrangement, keystone of the Dualism created in 1867, seemed to give up the independence of Hungary on which Deak had always insisted; for foreign policy, and the military needs springing from it, would be imposed on the Hungarian parliament by a majority of the Delegations, and there would not be ministers of foreign affairs and of war responsible to the Hungarian parliament. It was the decisive breach with Kossuth's Hungary of 1848 and the decisive concession to the Imperial demand for greatness. Yet it was not as a concession, but as an increase of Hungarian power, that it was justified. The Hungarian Delegation, held together by Magyar solidarity, would always vote as a unit; the Austrian Delegation would split into German and Slavs, so that Hungary would impose her will and policy upon the entire Empire. The argument would never have occurred to Deak, whose vision was limited to the internal affairs of Hungary and to the assertion of the rule of law. That Deak accepted the argument and made it his own was the first sign of the influence of Julius Andrassy, now to be decisive in the making of Dualism. Andrassy, as a young dashing magnate, had been a close adherent of Kossuth in 1848, had been hanged in effigy by the executioners of Francis Joseph, and had accompanied Kossuth into exile. He had returned and made his peace with the dynasty, when he realised the futility of Kossuth's schemes to overthrow the Habsburgs with foreign revolutionary aid. Now he became Deak's principal adviser, and Deak had already decided that he should be the first Prime Minister of free Hungary.
The two men made good partners. Deak understood Hungarian law and the art of parliamentary tactics; Andrassy knew the great world and the art of diplomacy. Each represented in different form the Hungarian adaptation to the modern world which preserved Great Hungary until the twentieth century. Deak was the ideal type of the petty noble who had emerged from his comitat to become a parliamentary statesman and who had developed his devotion to the traditional institutions of Hungary into Magyar nationalism; Andrassy was the ideal type of magnate who had left the Imperial court for the Budapest parliament and who had also become, in his way, a Magyar nationalist. But much of this nationalism was play-acting: the magnates still aspired to play nationalism was play-acting: the magnates still aspired to play a great role in Europe, and Andrassy's deepest ambition was to be Foreign Minister of a powerful Austrian Empire, not to be Prime Minister of Hungary. Both men were moderate, Deak from wise judgement, Andrassy from harsh experience. Both men desired to compromise with the Emperor and to conciliate the nationalities - enough at any rate to keep them from acting as allies of Vienna. Andrassy, however, was in a hurry: he wanted to display his diplomatic talents to Europe and gave a cynical twist to Deak's love of tactical manoeuvre. Andrassy was the perfect intermediary between Deak and the Emperor. Francis Joseph was estranged by Deak's probity and by his legal pedantry; Andrassy conciliated him by his impatience to be done with internal affairs and his desire to see the Empire, in some new form, play once more a great part in Europe. Deak and Andrassy would both have been shocked by the later violence of Magyar nationalism; yet both based their moderation on tactics and so prepared the war for its overthrow. The Hungarian was yet to be born who would accept the Slavs and Romanians as equals.
In the spring of 1866 the Belcredi ministry was far from accepting the plans of Deak, even with the bait which Andrassy had tied to them. Like Schmerling, they had come to regard the Hungarian Diet as a subversive body. As son often in human affairs, men, brought to office to pursue one policy, found themselves in a short time pursuing its opposite. The Belcredi ministry had been appointed to strengthen the Empire for a war against Prussia by settling with Hungary; as the war with Prussia came nearer, they put off a settlement in the hope that a victory in war would make concession unnecessary. Mensdorff and Esterhazy had nothing which could be called a foreign policy - nothing except as assertion of all Austrian's claims and a refusal to seek allies by the slightest concession. They would not appeal to German national feeling against Prussia; at the same time they would not restore the conservative partnership by recognising Prussia as an equal. They would not make concessions to the "revolutionary" Napoleon III; they would not conciliate the Tsar by concessions in the Near East. They would not buy Italian neutrality by surrendering Venetia, and dreamt, even now, of restoring the settlement of Italy as it had existed before 1859. Old Austria committed a brainless suicide; and Bismarck went to war in order to impose on Austria a decision which her rulers were incapable of making for themselves. The Austrian ministers feared victory as much as defeat; for victory would compel Austria to become without reserve the leading German power and so cause the eclipse of the cosmopolitan Austrian nobility. Esterhazy, who contributed to the war more than any other expressed their outlook: "I hate this war; for, whether we win or whether we lose, it will no longer be the old Austria." As in 1859 and again in 1914, Francis Joseph and his advisers were set on war and equally set on defeat.
At the last minute, after Italy had made a military alliance with Prussia, the Austrian government decided to surrender Venetia, despite their previous protests of principles. The offer was refused by Italy. The Austrian ministers were now as obstinate in concession as they had been earlier in refusal. Since Italy would not accept Venetia, it should go to Napoleon III. On June 12, 1866, they bought the neutrality which Napoleon III had neither intention nor ability to abandon by promising to surrender Venetia, whatever the outcome of the war, and by agreeing to a French protectorate of the Rhineland. Thus, even before defeat, the Paramount Power of Germany and Italy abandoned both. Aristocratic incompetence and dynastic pride made defeat certain. Archduke Albrecht, the best general of the Monarchy, could not, as a member of the Imperial house, be exposed to the risk of defeat. He was therefore removed from Bohemia, the decisive theatre of war, to Venetia, which was being defended solely for the privilege of surrendering it; and a second-rate soldier, Benedek, was sent to Bohemia. Albrecht won an empty victory over the Italians at Custoza. Benedek blundered over Bohemia until attacked on two sides and his army routed by the Prussians at Sadova on July 3, 1866. Austria had still great powers of resistance. Archduke Albrecht, recalled from Italy, organised a new defensive front on the Danube and challenged Prussia to a long war. This was not necessary. Bismarck aimed to preserve Austria, not to destroy her; and pushed on peace negotiations the harder in order to avoid the mediation of Napoleon III or Russian demands for a reward in the Near East. By the Peace of Prague (August 23, 1866), Austria lost Venetia and was excluded from Germany; she remained a Great Power.
The Austria which emerged from the war of 1866 was created by Bismarck as much as the Austria which emerged from the Napoleonic Wars was created by Metternich: created, that is, not in its internal balance, but in its significance as a Great Power. Metternich's Austria was a European necessity; Bismarck's Austria was a German necessity, or rather a Prussian necessity. It was the essential barrier against Greater Germany, against the Pan-German programme which would swamp the Prussian Junkers. And since many others were opposed to Great Germany, Austria was welcome for them also. It was better than Greater Germany for the Czechs, the Poles, and the Slovenes; in the international field, it was better than Greater Germany for France. Moreover, the alternative to Greater Germany, if the Austrian Empire fell, or perhaps its accompaniment, would be Pan-Slavism and the extension of Russian power; therefore the Austrian Empire was welcome for England and even for conservative Russians who disliked Pan-Slavism. Dominant in Germany and Italy, Austria had challenged too grossly the nationalist dogma of the time; excluded from Germany and Italy, Austria served to postpone the raising of the great questions in central and eastern Europe from which the Powers still shrank. Italy resented the existence of Austria; but Italy was without power, except when associated with the grievances of others, and within a few years Austria, with Bismarck's assistance, supervised Italy's policy almost as closely as in the days of Metternich. The Russian expansionists whose eyes were fixed on Constantinople resented the existence of Austria; but they were in a minority and the decision went against them in Russian counsels, except for a few weeks in 1878, until the destruction of Bismarck's Europe in 1914. Everyone else wanted Austria to be kept going. After the war of 1866 the Habsburg Monarchy was undoubtedly a Sick Man; this very fact won her European tolerance and even support.
Metternich had recognised the danger of becoming solely a European necessity; and had sought, with little success, a "mission" which should make the Empire acceptable to its peoples and so less dependent on the favour of others. the search for a mission was renewed after 1866, with little more success than in the days of Metternich. The Magyars, indeed, found a mission for Austria in the furthering of Magyar hegemony in Hungary; and this suited Bismarck's need. Bismarck revived the German alliance with the Magyars, which had been part of the Frankfurt programme in 1848. Only he improved on it: Frankfurt had sought Magyar aid for Greater Germany, Bismarck used Hungary as an ally against it, and this policy was the more welcome to the Hungarians. Still, it could not be Austria's sole mission to serve the ambition of the Magyars, who were hardly a fifth of her population. The German still hoped that the Habsburg Empire would further German cultural and economy supremacy in south-eastern Europe, or at any rate within the Empire. This did no fit so easily into Bismarck's system. Bismarck could not allow the revival of German Austrian strength and therewith a renewed danger of the "Empire of seventy millions"; on the other hand, he couldn't allow the Austrian Empire to lose its German character and so become eligible as the ally of France or even of Russia. In fact, Bismarck wished to preserved Austria as she was in 1866 - defeated, but still German; and the suspended animation of Austrian politics in the age of Dualism was largely the result of German needs. Certainly Germany would have resisted any real Austrian attempt to follow the only mission which could have justified her existence: the discovery of a way of cooperation between people of different nationalities, not based upon the hegemony of a privileged nation or class. Not that Bismarck, still less any other German statesman, understood the nature of the Austrian problem. The Poles were the only Slav minority of whom Prussian politicians had experience, and these they ruled by force without serious effort to conciliate them. Force alone would not do in Austria; this had been the decisive form the experience both of Bach and Schmerling. Francis Joseph was reluctant enough to accept the aid of the Magyars; he would certainly not place himself in the hands of the Germans also - especially as these would acquire real force only with a Greater German programme, detestable alike to Francis Joseph and to Bismarck. Still without a free cooperation of the peoples, Greater Germany was certain. The only alternative was Russian hegemony in central and eastern Europe; and in the outcome the subjects of the Habsburgs experienced first one and then the other. This was the measure of Habsburg failure.
THE MAKING OF DUALISM 1866-67
In August, 1866, immediately after defeat, the Magyars offered themselves as partners. Deak declared that they asked no more after defeat than before it; he meant by this that their highest ambition had now become capable of practical achievement. Andrassy, coming to Vienna to confer with the Emperor, spoke already as an Imperial statesman. He had very different views on Austria from the Old Conservatives who had hitherto provided the link between the Emperor and Hungary. Andrassy desired an Austria centralised, liberal, and German, just as Hungary would be centralised, liberal, and Magyar. This was a revival oft the idea of 1848, except that the partnership was now between Budapest and Vienna, instead of between Budapest and Frankfurt, so that there would still be room for the dynasty. The Germans and Magyars were to be the two "Peoples of state"' as for the others, Andrassy said, "the Slavs are not fit to govern, they must be ruled." Dualism as a partnership between Magyars and Germans was a favourite idea, or more correctly a favourite misunderstanding, int the following years; it was far from being the intention of Francis Joseph. He had brought himself to make concessions ot the Magyars in order to avoid making concessions to any other groups; and he certainly did not intend to surrender his power to the German liberals. Andrassy's clever talk in favour of the German Austrians offended Francis Joseph and actually restored the position of Belcredi, which had been shaken by the lost war; for Belcredi combined support, somewhat grudging, of Dualism with resistance to liberalism. In July, 1866, Francis Joseph, still needing support against Prussia, seemed ready to accept all Hungary's demands; in August, with the signing of the Peace of Prague, the immediate crisis was ended, and Andrassy returned to Budapest empty-handed.
The Hungarian demands had been clearly stated Belcredi now planned that the other provinces of the Empire should be brought artificially to formulate similar demands, so that Hungary should lose her unique position. The provincial Diets had therefore to be recalled and induced to claim privileges which they had not exercised for centuries of often never possessed. If, however, the Diets were elected on the existing franchise, they would not claim these privileges; for "electoral geometry" would produce German majorities in favour of a strong central parliament. The electoral system had to be made anew, and unreliable, that is centralist, officials hastily replaced by federalist nobles. Belcredi, operating conservative policy more thoroughly than ever before, ran the more sharply against its great contradiction: he was proposing to challenge both the bureaucracy and the German middle class throughout the Empire by breaking the bonds of the unitary state as it had existed for more than a century, yet his conservatism debarred him from seeking allies other than the great nobility. Belcredi meant to manufacture Slav majorities in the Diets, but he did not wish these majorities to represent popular movements. He objected to the German majorities of Schmerling as liberal, not as German; and he turned to the Slavs as conservative, clerical, and respectful to the nobility. The Slavs were conservative and clerical from immaturity; and as they grew into political consciousness, they, too, became liberal and demanded the Rights of Man. Thus the only political allies of Belcredi were not a serious force; and as they webcam a serious force, the landed nobility would suddenly developed administrative skills and that the German bureaucrats would be loyal enough to assist in dissolving the unitary state which they had themselves created.
Belcredi had, however, only a few months in which to demonstrate the failure of Old Conservatism for the last time. He had seemed the only alternative ot the German liberals; and in October, 1866, Francis Joseph discovered a German and in a way a liberal, who was no associated with the German liberals of the Empire. Beust, who now became Foreign Minister, had been for many years Prime Minister of Saxony and a leading opponent of Bismarck in the German Confederation. His appointment announced a policy of revenge against Prussia: Beust had no reason for political existence except his hostility to Bismarck, and his very appearance in office was a provocative reassertion of the connection between Austrian and Germany. Beust was no Metternich equipped, or handicapped, with a political philosophy; his stock-in-trade, like that of all the statesmen in the unreal petty German states, was smartness - the clever phrase and the quick result with no thought of the consequences. Beust had no "views" about the Austrian Empire. Naturally he regarded it as a German state, since he had been dealing with it as such for years; but he had no emotional attachment to any particular policy - the tradition of the unitary Empire which dominated the bureaucracy, the pseudo-historic ambitions of the nobility, the dynastic "mission" to protect the subject peoples, were alike indifferent to him. His only concern was somehow to settle the internal affairs of Austria, so that it would once more inspire confidence abroad and he could proceed to build up an anti-Prussian coalition. He therefore looked straight at the central fact which bureaucrats and nobles, Schmerling and Belcredi, ahd alike evaded: the only important thing was to settle with Hungary, and the only way of doing it was to give Hungarians what they demanded. His grasp of this truth brought him success where his predecessors had all failed and made him, on the Imperial side, the creator of Dualism. Yet this very success in international affairs doomed his foreign policy. He gave the Magyars, and to a lesser extent the Germans, a voice in the affairs of the Empire; and these were the two peoples who would never support a war of revenge against Prussia. The Magyars knew that they owed their success to the defeat of Austria in 1866; the Germans, despite their resentment against Prussia, would not go against the German national state. thus by a supreme paradox, the political system devised by an exponent of war against Prussia ensured the permanence of Bismarck's work.
It never occurred to Belcredi that a "foreigner" would settle the Austrian problem behind his back. He went slowly on his way, provoking the provincial ambitions of the non-Hungarian lands. Even Belcredi, with his dislike of a central Reichsrat, realised that the individual diets were not imposing enough to impress Hungary; on the other hand he would not revive the February Patent which had been "suspended" in September, 1865. He therefore fell back on the clause of the October Diploma, which provided for occasional meetings of the non-Hungarian lands in an "extraordinary Reichsrat." He could thus escape the electoral provisions of the February Patent. The Diets would be instructed to elect their delegates by a simple majority instead of each curia voting separately; and the result would be a Slav-conservative majority in the Reichsrat instead of the German liberal majority produced by "electoral geometry." Negotiations with Hungary could thus be dragged out indefinitely. Meanwhile, Croatia could be encouraged to make demands against Hungary and thus to weaken Hungary from within.
While Belcredi methodically prepared his version of "electoral geometry," Beust acted. He visited Budapest and established close agreement with Andrassy: both men thought in terms of foreign policy and both regarded with impatience the dogmatism of Belcredi, the hesitations of Francis Joseph, and even the probity of Deak. Beust, once satisfied of the possibility of an agreement, persuaded Francis Joseph to abandon the traditional method of "bargaining" between King and Diet; the Hungarian leaders were regarded as a responsible government, according to the laws of 1848, and came to Vienna for direct negotiation. This was the decisive step, for in agreeing to a responsible government Francis Joseph had acceded to the Hungarian programme and had to accept concessions from the Hungarian ministers instead of they from him. They negotiations at Vienna were of a strange, illegal character: Andrassy and his colleagues already spoke for Hungary, and the Austrian ministers, though technically still Imperial ministers, spoke merely for the non-Hungarian lands, for the lesser Austria as created by Dualism. Francis Joseph, once convinced that the Hungarian proposals would leave him in control of the army and of foreign affairs, was in a hurry to finish; as always, impatience followed his prolonged hesitation, and he jettisoned old obligations and advisers. In December, 1866, a Croat deputation came to Vienna offering to cooperate with the Empire on an equal footing with Hungary; they were brusquely told that the services of Jellacic were not regarded with favour as they had been in 1848 and that they must settle with Hungary as best they cold. Belcredi was still able to issue a Patent on January 2 1867, for the meeting of an "extraordinary Reichsrat"; this was a vain expedient. He and the other Austrian ministers could only listen to the Hungarian proposals and sadly acquiesce, knowing that the Emperor had already made his decision. On February 7, 1867, Belcredi and "the Counts" were dismissed; and Beust was left alone, with a few officials, to wind up Old Austria. In this characteristic way, Dualism was manufactured helter-skelter; and the constitution of Austria-Hungary determined by a Saxon politician and a Magyar aristocrat.
The intention of all Austrian ministers, of Schmerling as well as of Belcredi, and the original intention of Deak, had been a settlement between the two "Imperial halves." Hungary had certainly been consulted; and Dualism did not become effective until transformed into a law of Hungarian parliament in march, 1867. The other, nameless "half" had no voice: Francis Joseph had settled without it. To wait for the consent of a non-existent Reichsrat seemed unnecessary; besides, the Reichsrat might dispute points which Hungary had already accepted. The Hungarians, however, insisted that the non-Hungarian lands must approve the settlement, though they could neither alter nor reject it. Beust therefore revived the February Patent, which had been designed for the entire Empire, and applied it which had been designed for the entire Empire and applied it casually to the "half"; the "narrower Reichsrat" of the Patent became henceforth the "ordinary Reichsrat" of constitutional Austria. This device ran up against the last relics of Belcredi. The Diets, elected under his management in November and December, 1866, were federalist or conservative; and five of the most important refused to acknowledge the February Patent or to send members to the Reichsrat. These recalcitrant Diets were abruptly dissolved, and the "electoral geometry" of Schmerling revived with such force that a German majority was manufactured even in Bohemia. Czechs and Slovenes continued to boycott the Reichsrat without avail. It had the appearance of a respectable parliament; and completed the formalities of Dualism by accepting the settlement as a "constitutional law" in December, 1867.
Dualism was exclusively a "compromise" between the Emperor and the Hungarians. The Hungarians agreed that there should be a single great state for war and foreign affairs; Francis Joseph handed over the internal affairs of Hungary to the "Magyar nation." The Hungarians also agreed that there should be a customs union with the rest of Monarchy, to be renewed every ten years. There were thus three separate organisations: the permanent "common monarchy," which still presented a great Habsburg Power to the outer world; the temporary economic union of Austria-Hungary; and the two separate states, Austria and Hungary. The "common monarchy" was confined to the Emperor and his court, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the inister of War. There was no common Prime Minister and no common cabinet. Beust, given the title of Imperial Chancellor in honour of his achievement in disrupting the Empire, attempted to exercise an authority superior to the two state ministries, and was imitated by a later Foreign Minister, Kalnoky; these attempts were successfully resisted by the Hungarians. Unofficially and without constitutional authority, the Crown Council of the Emperor acted as a common cabinet: it was attended by the two Prime Ministers, the common ministers, a few Archdukes, and the Chief of Staff. They could do no more than advise the Emperor; and decision on "great policy" remained in his hands. This had been the motive of Francis Joseph in making the compromise: in foreign affair he was still supreme.
etc....
The Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy (1867-1918)
Laszlo Csorba
Emperors and Kings - Antecedents of the Dual Monarchy
Having drawn certain conclusions from the events of 1848-1849, from the mid-1850s Hungarian and non-Hungarian contemporaries were preoccupied with the fundamental question of what form the relationship between Hungary and the Hapsburg Empire should take. The starting point, which was agreed to y every important player, was that in 1848 Hungary had managed to rid itself of the shackles of feudalism but that in the self-defensive war waged for national self-determination in 1849 the country had been defeated. As Ferenc Deak and his followers saw it, the Monarchy was an indispensable protective power for the Hungarians wedged in between the Slav and German peoples. The task, therefore, was to reach an agreement with the court in order to maintain the status of Vienna as a great power. Deak thought in terms of an agreement that would not contravene the provision of Hungarian self-determination, which was based on a personal union (similar to the one established in 1848). Indeed, it was hoped that as a part of the Hapsburg Monarchy, Hungary would be able to pursue its own "imperial" policies to a certain degree, primarily in regard to the Balkans. Lajos Kossuth and his followers, both in Hungary and abroad, shared the basic proposition made by Deak but came to a radically different conclusion. They were also of the opinion that a protective power was needed against German and pan-Slav pressure, but they did not believe that Austria was right for this role. They regarded it as too weak, chiefly because it prevented the nations living without its borders from realising their aspirations for national progress. The solution was some kind of alliance of the smaller nations along the Danube. This alliance could then be developed into a confederation built on democratic principles.
Both concepts took the same European and Hungarian realities as their starting point. For example, it was clear that there would be no modern capitalist economy, nor any rapid material or intellectual growth, without foreign capital. The two divergent solutions outlining Hungary's future development actually provided an answer to the question of what should be the source of the capital inflow essential for Hungary due to an insufficient domestic capital accumulation. Those who believed in the future of the Hapsburg Empire earnestly believed that Hungary's fate should be tied to the fate of the Empire and did not regard a certain limitation imposed on national self-determination as an unbearable sacrifice. On the other hand, those that had no faith in the Empire's future sought ways to be liberated from such bondage and were convinced that Hungary could only retain control over its own future if national self-determination was extended and developed into country's full Independence.
These two concepts offered true alternative not only because of the different standpoints and values they embodied - one of liberalism and the other of democratism - but also because in the 1850s it was not possible to "objectively" establish who would be right in regard to the fate of the empire. At the time, the Hapsburg Empire projected an image which could be interpreted as one of stability and of instability alike.
Ferdinand I's nephew, Franz Joseph, who succeeded him in 1848, lost Lombardy in 1859, in the war between the Italians, the French and the Austrians. In the early 1860s it was becoming increasingly evident that the Hungarian political leadership were not seeking a way out of the crisis - resulting from the autocratic nature of the imperial regime as well as by Hungary's passive resistance - through an agreement with the minorities and the development of social reform, which meant that the majority wished to pursue the political direction proposed by Deak and not by Kossuth. In the third Hungarian representative parliament that assembled in December 1865 Deak's party won a clear majority. In March 1866 a 67-member committee convened to prepare the proposal of "the common affairs", which delegated th task of dealing with the key issues to a 15-member sub-committee presided over by Count Gyula Andrassy, who had returned home from exile and was increasingly placed in the limelight by Deak.
On 3 July 1866, Franz Joseph finally accepted the proposal for a compromise from the Hungarian political leadership after the Austrian defeat at the Battle of Koniggratz. during the Austro-Prussian war, which had broken out to gain dominance over the German States, the Prussians even allied themselves with the fledgling Italian kingdom against Vienna. The Prussian division, which were better equipped and better led than their Austrian opponents, invaded Bohemia and won a decisive victory over the emperor's forces. The Austrian military failure marked the end of an historical process of six centuries: the Hapsburg State was squeezed out of Germany once and for all. Franz Joseph was forced to accept the humiliation that Prussia had excluded him and his empire from German unification. Franz Joseph and his Miltiades clique, who were thirsting for revenge against the Germans, realised that entering into a compromise with the Hungarians was an inevitable condition before further steps could be taken. The proposal had to be approved by parliament which reconvened for November 1866. The pivotal points of the agreement guaranteed the ruler's unrestricted command over the army and his right to pre-approve all proposals, ie. in parliament his ministers were only allowed to submit bills which the emperor had approved in advance. Gyula Andrassy's appointment as prime minister dates to 17 February 1867 and three days after this the third government responsible to parliament in Hungarian history was formed; on 20 March the common affairs ill was passed by 257 to 117, in the absence of 22 representatives and the Croatian delegates.
